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Essay
A New Trade Framework 
for Global Healthcare R&D
Tim Hubbard and James Love
T
he AIDS crisis has brought to 
public notice what has always 
been generally true—that 
the existing business model for drug 
development leads to high prices 
and unequal access. There is now 
widespread dissatisfaction with drug 
prices in both the developed (Families 
USA 2003) and developing world 
(Correa 2000). Governments and 
health insurers are ﬁ  nding ways to 
deny access to the newest and priciest 
products. In the United States and 
other countries without a universal 
public health system, the uninsured 
simply cannot afford the newest 
medicines. In developing countries, 
life-saving medicines are priced beyond 
the reach of most people, a morally 
offensive outcome (TrueVisionTV 
2003). Huge publicity surrounds 
negotiated price reductions for speciﬁ  c 
drugs in speciﬁ  c developing countries, 
yet the effect on the overall access 
problem is tiny.
Today’s high drug prices are a direct 
consequence of a business model that 
uses a single payment to cover both the 
cost of manufacture of a drug and the 
cost of the research and development 
(R&D) carried out by manufacturers 
to discover it. A 20-year patent-based 
marketing monopoly is then granted 
to the drug’s developers to prevent 
their prices being undercut by ‘generic’ 
copies produced by manufacturers 
who do not have R&D costs to recover. 
Preventing such ‘free riding’ on R&D 
has become a global trade issue at the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
(Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). The 
implementation of the TRIPS (Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) agreement and a growing 
number of regional and bilateral 
agreements on intellectual property 
require most countries to implement 
tough patent systems that discourage 
or eliminate competition from 
manufacturers of generic medicines 
(Box 1).
Unfortunately, monopoly-based 
business models have unpleasant side 
effects. Since the primary responsibility 
of any company is to maximise return 
on investment, it is unsurprising that 
there is pressure on pharmaceutical 
companies to set drug prices to 
whatever level gives the highest return, 
excluding those individuals who cannot 
afford to pay, rather than maximising 
the number of patients treated. 
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Box 1. Trade Agreements on Intellectual 
Property
The most important is the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which requires member countries to issue 20-year 
patents on all ﬁ  elds of technology.  All but the least-developed countries must comply by 
2005.  Going much further than the TRIPS are a plethora of regional and bilateral ‘TRIPS-Plus’ 
trade agreements, pushed in particular by the United States, which require even higher levels 
of intellectual property protection, such as limitations on the use of compulsory licensing, 
a tool used by governments to override the strong exclusive rights of a patent in return 
for compensation to patent owners.  In 2001 the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health, which said that ‘the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all’.  In order to promote ‘access to medicines for 
all’, countries have to ﬁ  nd new ways of ﬁ  nancing R&D.February 2004  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 2  |  Page 0148 PLoS Biology  |  http://biology.plosjournals.org
There is also pressure to misuse the 
power given by patents, using them 
as anticompetitive weapons to block 
innovation and extend marketing 
monopolies. And there are growing 
fears that the huge growth in the use 
of patents is in itself starting to inhibit 
research (CIPR 2002; Anonymous 
2003; Royal Society 2003). Something 
that is less well recognised is that this 
system is an enormously inefﬁ  cient 
way of purchasing R&D. There is a 
considerable lack of transparency in 
pharmaceutical R&D investment, but 
the available data indicate that only 
about 10% of drug sales go towards 
R&D on new products. Only about 
one-quarter of new drug approvals 
are rated by the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
have therapeutic beneﬁ  t over existing 
treatments (NIHCM 2002; see Figure 
1). Measured by investment, only 
about one-ﬁ  fth of the 10% is invested 
in innovative products (Love 2003a). 
There is also very little research for 
diseases that primarily afﬂ  ict the poor 
(Trouiller et al. 2001; WHO 2003).
Propping up the present structure 
for ﬁ  nancing R&D (Figure 2A) is the 
widely held belief that the private sector 
plays a key role in the development of 
new medicines and that it is necessary 
to grant patents to incentivise private-
sector ﬁ  nancing. If this were true, it 
would make sense to tolerate all sorts 
of bad outcomes, because the fruits of 
R&D eventually beneﬁ  t everyone. But 
granting a 20-year marketing monopoly 
on a patented invention is only one way 
to ﬁ  nance R&D, and the shortcomings 
of the present system are increasingly 
hard to ignore. Suggestions for 
alternatives are beginning to come 
from many quarters (Baker and 
Chatani 2002; CGSD 2003; Hubbard 
and Love 2003; Weisbrod 2003). In this 
essay, we present practical proposals 
to modify trade rules based solely on 
intellectual property so that alternative 
policy instruments can be used to 
encourage innovation.
A New Trade Framework
Analysis of worldwide drug 
expenditure shows that spending 
varies, but is close to 1% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) in most 
developed and developing countries 
(Love 2003b). Assuming that about 
a tenth of the revenue from the sale 
of drugs is ploughed back into R&D 
on new products, that means that 
countries already indirectly contribute 
about 0.1% GDP to support this. This 
contribution is enforced by trade 
agreements, which require the granting 
of patents to prevent ‘free riding’ via 
the purchase of generic drugs (see 
Box 1). Suppose the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) developed an 
R&D contribution ‘norm’ based upon 
this or a more appropriate ﬁ  gure and 
that there was international agreement 
that countries evaluated as meeting this 
norm would no longer be regarded 
as ‘free riding’. Trade rules could 
then be modiﬁ  ed to allow countries 
to meet this norm by any means, not 
just by the implementation of strict 
TRIPS intellectual property rules, as at 
present.
Countries that met the norm would 
then be free to decide whether they 
wanted to follow a strictly patent-based 
system as at present, with high drug 
prices for 20 years, or experiment with 
new models based on the creation 
of separate competitive markets 
for sales and R&D (Figure 2B). 
Countries adopting the latter system 
would remove patents on ﬁ  nal drug 
compounds, placing them in the public 
domain. This would allow them to 
become a freely traded commodity, 
creating a competitive manufacture 
and sales market with low generic 
prices. At the same time, in order to 
meet the required R&D contribution 
norm, they would have to create an 
efﬁ  cient R&D virtual market alongside. 
However, the costs of this would be 
more than offset by the reduction in 
drugs prices, making substantial savings 
for that country overall.
Business Models for an Effective 
Virtual R&D Market
The existing system (Figure 2A), 
despite its failings, does lead to the 
development of new drugs. The 
challenge in creating a virtual R&D 
market is to ﬁ  nd viable business models 
for successful drug development in 
the absence of marketing monopoly 
incentives.
One obvious approach is direct 
funding of drug development. For 
example, the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), the national agency 
in the United States, already spends 
$27 billion per year on research, a 
substantial amount of which is directed 
towards drug development, including 
clinical trials. The NIH already has a 
track record in developing important 
drugs for severe illnesses, such as 
cancer or AIDS, showing that this 
is a viable model. It is also widely 
recognised that much of the research 
carried out across the world by similar 
agencies underpins the existing 
commercial research that leads to new 
drugs.
Governments could expand direct 
funding for drug development, either 
through the existing structures in 
academia or through funding R&D 
arms of existing companies to carry out 
speciﬁ  c drug R&D. Such directed drug 
development funding could be similar 
to existing nonproﬁ  t development 
projects, such as those currently 
resourced to address treatments 
for neglected diseases like malaria 
and tuberculosis (TB). Examples of 
such projects are the Medicines for 
Malaria Venture (www.mmv.org), 
the Global Alliance for TB Drug 
Development (www.tballiance.org), 
the International AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative (www.iavi.org), the Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases Initiative (Butler 
2003b) (www.dndi.org), and the 
Institute for One World Health 
(www.oneworldhealth.org). 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020052.g001
Figure 1. A Breakdown of the 1,035 New Drugs 
Approved by the FDA between 1989 and 2000
More than three-fourths are classed 
as having no therapeutic beneﬁ  t over 
existing products, so-called ‘me too’ drugs 
(NIHCM 2002). Less than 1% address 
diseases that primarily afﬂ  ict the poor, 
for which new treatments would have the 
greatest effect on world healthcare (WHO 
2003). Industry trade associations, reports 
to investors, and data from income tax 
returns suggest somewhere between 10% 
and 15% of the $430 billion revenues 
(reported in 2002) are spent on R&D, but 
data from regulatory bodies imply that 
only approximately 2%–3% is actually 
spent on R&D that leads to new medicines 
with therapeutic beneﬁ  ts over existing 
ones, and even this is inﬂ  ated by research 
primarily designed to achieve marketing 
outcomes (Love 2003a; WHO 2003).February 2004  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 2  |  Page 0149 PLoS Biology  |  http://biology.plosjournals.org
Many are doubtful that increased 
direct funding would generate 
sufﬁ  cient incentives or be managed 
efﬁ  ciently enough. An alternative 
market-based approach is one in 
which R&D organisations compete 
for rewards for speciﬁ  c R&D output, 
referred to by economists as a prize 
model (Wright 1983; Kremer 1998; 
Shavell and van Ypersele 2001). In 
a simple formulation, governments 
would place large sums into a fund that 
would be allocated every year to ﬁ  rms 
that bring new products to market. This 
could work with or without patents. If 
products were protected by patents or 
other intellectual property claims, the 
government could grant compulsory 
licenses (a procedure allowed by trade 
agreements to override monopoly 
rights on a patent, in return for 
compensation to rights owners; see 
Box 1) and permit rapid introduction 
of generic competition. The reward 
system could be a lump-sum payment, 
eliminating any incentive to continue 
to market the product, or a long-
term payout structure, which would 
depend upon evidence of both usage 
and efﬁ  cacy. Prize systems could be 
designed to be fairly similar to the 
current system, with big payoffs for 
successful entrepreneurs, but even with 
this approach, there would be huge 
opportunities to improve welfare. The 
reward system could be more rational 
than the existing system, allocating 
greater rewards for innovative products 
and less for ‘me too’ products that do 
not work better than existing products. 
Premiums could be given for therapies 
that address treatment gaps or for 
inventions that pave the way to new 
classes of drugs. 
Organisations competing for prizes 
might be expected to behave secretly to 
ensure that they are the ones to obtain 
‘credit’ for the fruits of their work. 
However, progress in research is also 
driven by free exchange of information. 
It may be possible to design models 
that both reward R&D outputs and at 
the same time encourage complete 
and continuous openness with 
intermediate research outputs. There 
are now a number of examples of open 
collaborative public goods models 
(Cukier 2003), such as those used 
for the Human Genome Project. The 
proponents of such models point to the 
success of GNU/Linux in the software 
ﬁ  eld as evidence that major projects 
can be undertaken with radically 
different business models. One of 
the beneﬁ  ts of complete openness is 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020052.g002
Figure 2. Funding Healthcare R&D
(A) A schematic of the way the public currently funds healthcare R&D. Academic 
research funded by government research agencies is paid for via taxes. This is a mixture 
of pure research into fundamentals and directed research, including clinical trials. 
Despite this, there is a dogma that academic R&D cannot produce drugs since it does 
not have the required commercial pressures to turn ideas into products. Patents ensure 
the public pays for commercial R&D via their purchase of medicines at high prices, 
compared to those of generic copies. The distortion of research priorities (too much 
spent on ‘me too’ drugs and too little on neglected diseases) has been recognised by 
governments for some time, and a variety of push-and-pull mechanisms have been 
introduced (or are being considered) to encourage research that more closely reﬂ  ects 
public priorities. Examples of push incentives are tax breaks for R&D and other 
incentives such as special marketing monopolies for products as a reward for investing 
in research on orphan drugs or testing with pediatric patients. Pull incentives currently 
being discussed are advance-purchase commitments, with which governments guarantee 
to buy a certain amount of a drug if one is developed, or prize models. Some of these 
schemes are thought to be inefﬁ  cient, particularly those that are indiscriminate and 
provide expensive subsidies relative to the amount of new R&D they ‘encourage’.
(B) A schematic of the way funding of healthcare R&D could work if separate 
competitive markets for sales and R&D were created. A crucial difference is the absence 
of monopolies on ﬁ  nal products, enabling competition between generic producers and 
greatly reduced prices. Incentives to develop new drugs would be provided by a new 
virtual market in R&D. ‘Nationally directed R&D funds’ could represent anything from 
rewards for innovation using market based mechanisms such as prize models (see text) 
to centralised funding agencies, similar to the NIH model, or multiple R&D investment 
funding bodies that compete for new resources. Contributions to R&D could be via 
taxation or as a legal obligation when paying for private healthcare plans (see text). The 
ability to design what would be rewarded in the virtual market would allow governments 
to set R&D priorities and build up local capacity within their own countries. Countries 
could choose weaker patent protection and create an environment in which all research 
groups could build on each other’s work.February 2004  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 2  |  Page 0150 PLoS Biology  |  http://biology.plosjournals.org
that it allows independent and open 
evaluation of R&D outputs, which helps 
in the allocation of ‘credit’ whether 
in the form or prizes or new research 
grants. The open-access publishing 
movement (Brown et al. 2003) has 
the potential to help in this process 
by allowing independent analysis of 
published science, which will help 
research funding agencies measure 
research outputs.
Competitive Intermediators
An R&D contribution norm, 
established by treaty, would ensure 
that the amount of money being spent 
on R&D is maintained. However, new 
mechanisms would be needed to collect 
the money to ﬁ  nance the R&D, as it 
would no longer come via drug sales. 
This could be via general taxation, 
although in countries with a private 
health insurance system this may be 
anathema. Many will also worry that a 
centralised national drug development 
agency taking decisions on R&D 
priorities and allocation of funds (via 
prizes or grants as discussed above) 
could easily become bureaucratic and 
inefﬁ  cient.
As a possible alternative, we propose 
a competitive ﬁ  nancing scheme that 
would work through R&D investment 
intermediators. These R&D funds 
would be licensed and regulated (like 
pension funds). Their role would be 
to manage R&D assets on behalf of 
consumers. Individuals (or employers) 
would be required to make minimum 
contributions into R&D funds, much 
as there are mandatory contributions 
to social security or health insurance or 
to pension funds. Government would 
set the required contribution, but the 
individual (or employer) would be free 
to choose the particular intermediator 
that received their contributions. 
Intermediators would compete to 
attract funds to invest in R&D on 
the basis of their prowess for drug 
development and upon their priorities. 
Different business models for ﬁ  nancing 
R&D could be tested in such a market, 
with intermediators experimenting 
with prize systems, direct investments 
in proﬁ  t or nonproﬁ  t entities, open 
collaborative public good models, or 
other approaches.
A Change for the Common Good
We believe the economics of a 
change in the paradigm for funding 
R&D are highly favourable. Taken 
together, the two core steps of changing 
the trade framework and moving 
away from marketing monopolies can 
change the world in a positive way. We 
can raise global R&D levels as a matter 
of policy and ensure that resources 
ﬂ  ow into the areas of the greatest 
need, and we can do so knowing that 
the poor and the rich will have access 
to new inventions at marginal cost. 
Policy-makers will be weaned from their 
current unhealthy addiction to ever-
higher levels of intellectual property 
rights as the only instrument to raise 
R&D levels, a path that has increasingly 
reached diminishing returns or 
become counterproductive. With new 
instruments to address the overall levels 
of R&D investment, policy-makers 
can more constructively address the 
well-known inefﬁ  ciencies in the patent 
system without the fear that global R&D 
levels will suffer and explore alternative 
models (Butler 2003a). At the same 
time, the system of prescribing 
medicines will be transformed by a 
substantial reduction in the distorting 
inﬂ  uences of the current multibillion-
dollar industry of marketing medicines 
to doctors and (increasingly) directly to 
the public. Similarly, without marketing 
monopolies to protect, there will be far 
less spent to inﬂ  uence the governments 
that set the rules that regulate 
such monopolies. If implemented 
worldwide, one of our most vexing 
ethical dilemmas can be resolved in 
a manner that actually promotes the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health mandate to encourage access to 
medicine for all.
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